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Abstract
Rule-based argumentation systems are developed for reasoning about defeasible
information. They take as input a theory made of a set of facts, a set of strict
rules, which encode strict information, and a set of defeasible rules which describe
general behavior with exceptional cases. They build arguments by chaining such
rules, define attacks between them, use a semantics for evaluating the arguments,
and finally identify the plausible conclusions that follow from the theory.
Undercutting is one of the main attack relations of such systems. It consists
of blocking the application of defeasible rules when their exceptional cases hold.
In this paper, we consider this relation for capturing all the different conflicts in a
theory. We present the first argumentation system that uses only undercutting, and
show that it satisfies the rationality postulates proposed in the literature. Finally,
we fully characterize both its extensions and its plausible conclusions under various
acceptability semantics. Indeed, we show full correspondences between extensions
and sub-theories of the theory under which the argumentation system is built.
Keywords: Defeasible reasoning, Rule-based systems, Argumentation.
1. Introduction
Argumentation is a promising approach for reasoning with conflicting infor-
mation [2]. It consists of generating arguments, defining attacks between them,
evaluating the arguments using a semantics, then identifying plausible conclusions.
In the computational argumentation literature, there are two families of seman-
tics: extension semantics, initiated in [3], and ranking semantics, introduced in [4].
The first family looks for sets of arguments, called extensions, that are acceptable
1This paper extensively develops the content of the conference paper [1]. Indeed, it investigates
the properties of the new system under two additional semantics, and characterizes the outcomes of
the system under those semantics.
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together. Then, an absolute acceptability degree (accepted or rejected) is assigned
to each argument on the basis of its extensions membership. Ranking semantics
look for rank-ordering arguments from the most to the least acceptable ones. The
ranking may come from the comparison of pairs or sets of arguments, or from de-
grees assigned to arguments, etc. Gradual semantics from [5] are a sub-class of
ranking semantics. In this paper, we focus on extension semantics, in particular
those proposed in [3].
Dung proposed in [3] various semantics at an abstract level, i.e., without tak-
ing into account the structure of arguments or the nature of attacks. His abstract
framework was instantiated by several scholars. The idea is as follows. Start with a
knowledge base whose elements are encoded in a logical language, generate argu-
ments using the consequence operator attached to the language, identify the attacks
and apply Dung’s semantics for the evaluation task. There are two major categories
of instantiations for this abstract framework. The first category uses deductive log-
ics (such as propositional logic [6, 7] or any Tarskian logic [8]) whereas the second
category uses rule-based languages.
Rule-based argumentation systems, which use rule-based languages, are de-
veloped for reasoning about defeasible information. As a major feature, they take
as input a theory made of three types of information: facts, strict rules, which
encode general strict information, and defeasible rules which describe general be-
havior with exceptional cases. They build arguments by chaining such rules, define
attacks between them, use a semantics for evaluating the arguments, and finally
identify the plausible conclusions that follow from the theory. Examples of such
systems are ASPIC [9], its extended version ASPIC+ [10], DeLP [11] and the sys-
tems developed in [12, 13, 14, 15]. Some of these systems satisfy the rationality
postulates proposed in [16]. However, their plausible conclusions have never been
characterized. In other words, they have never been expressed in a way that clar-
ifies how they are chosen among all the possible conclusions that follow from the
theory. Thus, despite the wide use of these systems, their outputs are still unknown.
The system DeLP uses rebuttal as attack relation. Rebuttal captures the fact
that the conclusions of two arguments are conflicting. Systems like ASPIC [9]
and Pollock’s system [17] use, in addition to rebuttal, undercut which blocks the
application of defeasible rules in particular contexts. Let us illustrate this relation
by an example borrowed from [17]. Consider the following argument A:
The object is red (or) because it looks red (lr).
The argument A uses the defeasible rule lr ⇒ or (meaning that generally, if an
object looks red, then it is red). Assume now the following argument B:
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The defeasible rule lr ⇒ or is not applicable because the object is
illuminated by a red light.
The argument B undercuts A and the conclusion (or) of A does not hold. Un-
dercut deals with the exceptions of defeasible rules. Indeed, every exception of a
defeasible rule gives birth to an attack from any argument concluding the excep-
tion toward any argument using the rule. In the example, being illuminated by a
red light is a specific case where the rule lr ⇒ or cannot be applied.
In this paper, we show that undercut can do more than dealing with exceptions
of defeasible rules. It can also perfectly play the role of rebuttal and assumption
attack [18], and deals thus with inconsistency in a theory. The basic idea is the
following: any defeasible rule x ⇒ y should be blocked when ¬y follows from
the theory. We propose the first rule-based argumentation system that uses un-
dercutting as its single attack relation. We show that it satisfies the rationality
postulates discussed in [16] under naive, complete, grounded, stable and preferred
semantics. From a conceptual point of view, this system is much simpler than
existing ones that combine rebuttal and undercut. Indeed, in order to satisfy the
postulates, ASPIC requires one variant of rebuttal per semantics: unrestricted re-
but is used under grounded semantics and restricted rebut is used under complete
and preferred semantics. Our system satisfies the postulates under all semantics.
Moreover, restricted rebut is based on an assumption which is not intuitive. Indeed,
this relation compares only the rules whose heads are inconsistent, and neglects the
remaining structure of the arguments. For instance, it considers that the argument
(x1, x1 ⇒ y1, y1 → z) attacks the argument (x2, x2 → y2, y2 ⇒ ¬z) since z
follows from a strict rule while ¬z follows from a defeasible one. Note that the
converse is not true even if the first rule of the first argument is defeasible while
that of the second argument is strict. Our system does not make such assumptions.
The second main contribution of the paper consists of providing the first and
full characterizations of the extensions as well as the set of plausible conclusions
of our system under all the semantics proposed in [3]. Indeed, we show one-to-one
correspondences between extensions and sub-theories of the theory over which the
argumentation system is built. We also show that the plausible conclusions are the
formulas that follow from all the sub-theories characterizing the extensions under a
given semantics. These correspondences ensure the correctness and completeness
of the outcomes of the proposed system.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the rule-based system we
are interested in. Section 3 analyses its properties, namely it shows that the system
satisfies the existing rationality postulates as well as a new one. Section 4 charac-
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terizes its outputs (extensions and plausible conclusions), and Section 5 compares
it with existing rule-based systems and concludes.
2. Rule-based argumentation system
As in any paper in defeasible reasoning (e.g. [19, 20, 21]), three kinds of in-
formation are distinguished: Facts representing factual information like ‘Tweety is
a bird’, strict rules representing general information which do not have exceptions
like ‘Penguins do not fly’ and defeasible rules describing general behaviors with
exceptional cases like ‘Birds fly’. In other words, any rule which has exceptions is
considered as defeasible.
In what follows, L is a set of literals, i.e. atoms or negation of atoms, repre-
senting knowledge. The negation of an atom x from L is denoted by ¬x. L′ is a
set of atoms used for naming rules. The two sets satisfy the constraint L∩L′ = ∅.
Every rule has a single name and two rules cannot have the same name. Through-
out the paper, rules are named r, r1, r2, . . . . The function Rule(ri) returns the rule
whose name is ri.
Facts are elements of L.
Defeasible rules are of the form x1, . . . , xn ⇒ x and x, x1..., xn are literals
in L. Such rules are read as follows: If x1, . . . , xn hold, then generally x
holds as well.
Strict rules are of the form x1, . . ., xn → x where x1, . . ., xn are literals of
L and {
x ∈ L or
x ∈ L′ and Rule(x) is defeasible.
These rules are read as follows: If x1, . . . , xn hold, then always x holds as
well.
Note that defeasible rules may have an empty body, i.e. the set {x1..., xn} may
be empty. However, strict rules are not allowed to have empty bodies. The reason is
that a strict rule with an empty body represents a fact and thus a factual information
and not a general behavior with no exceptions. Furthermore, the names of rules
cannot appear in bodies of (strict or defeasible) rules. This means that it is not
possible to represent information of the form “if rule r is applied (or is blocked),
then y holds”. We also assume that a strict rule cannot be blocked since it represents
certain information (i.e., if its body holds, then necessarily its head holds as well).
Things are different with defeasible rules. By default, any defeasible rule can be
applied, unless explicitly mentioned in the language by strict rules. Indeed, a strict
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rule x1, . . ., xn → x with x ∈ L′ is read as follows: If x1, . . . , xn hold, then the
defeasible rule x is always not applicable.
Definition 1 (Theory). A theory is a triple T = (F ,S,D) where F ⊆ L is a set
of facts, and S ⊆ L′ (respectively D ⊆ L′) is a set of strict (defeasible) rule names.
It is worth pointing out that the two sets S and D contain names of rules and
not the rules themselves.
Notations: For each rule x1, . . . , xn → x (as well as x1, . . . , xn ⇒ x) whose
name is r, the head of the rule is Head(r) = x and the body of the rule is
Body(r) = {x1, . . . , xn}. Let T = (F ,S,D) and T ′ = (F ′,S ′,D′) be two
theories. We say that T is a sub-theory of T ′, written T ⊑ T ′, iff F ⊆ F ′ and
S ⊆ S ′ and D ⊆ D′. The relation ⊏ is the strict version of ⊑ (i.e., it is the case
that at least one of the three inclusions is strict). Finally, let Defs(T ) = D.
We show how new information is produced from a given theory. This is gener-
ally the case when (strict and/or defeasible) rules are fired in a derivation schema.
Definition 2 (Derivation schema). Let T = (F ,S,D) be a theory and x ∈ L ∪
L′. A derivation schema for x from T is a finite sequence d = 〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉
such that:
xn = x
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
xi ∈ F and ri = ∅, or
ri ∈ S ∪ D and Head(ri) = xi and Body(ri) ⊆ {x1, .., xi−1}
Seq(d) = {x1, . . . , xn}.
Facts(d) = {xi | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ri = ∅}.
Strict(d) = {ri | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ri ∈ S}.
Def(d) = {ri | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ri ∈ D}.
CN(T ) denotes the set of all literals that have a derivation schema from T .
It is clear from the definition that CN is monotonic.
Example 1. Let T1 = (F1,S1,D1) be a theory such that F1 = {p, b}, S1 = {r1}
and D1 = {r2} where Rule(r1) = p→ ¬f and Rule(r2) = b⇒ f . From T1, we
have the following minimal derivations:
d1 = 〈(p, ∅)〉
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d2 = 〈(b, ∅)〉
d3 = 〈(p, ∅), (¬f, r1)〉
d4 = 〈(b, ∅), (f, r2)〉
A notion of consistency and another of coherence are associated with this log-
ical language.
Definition 3 (Consistency–Coherence). A set X ⊆ L is consistent iff ∄x, y ∈
X such that x = ¬y. It is inconsistent otherwise. A theory T = (F ,S,D) is
consistent iff CN(T ) is consistent. It is coherent iff CN(T ) ∩ D = ∅.
The set of strict rules should be closed under transposition. However, only
rules whose head is an element of L (i.e., not a name of a rule) are transposed.
Transposition is required for ensuring the rationality postulates proposed in [16].
Definition 4 (Closure under transposition). A transposition of a strict rule x1,
. . ., xn → x, with x ∈ L, is a strict rule x1, . . ., xi−1, ¬x, xi+1, . . ., xn → ¬xi
for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let S be a set of strict rules’ names. We define Clt(S) as the
minimal set such that:
S ⊆ Clt(S), and
If r ∈ Clt(S) and Rule(r′) is a transposition of Rule(r) then r′ ∈ Clt(S).
We say that S is closed under transposition iff Clt(S) = S .
Throughout the paper, we will consider undercut for capturing all the possible
conflicts between arguments. Thus, undercut will be used both for blocking general
rules in presence of exceptions of these rules, and also for handling inconsistency.
For that purpose, for each defeasible rule whose name is r, the theory should con-
tain the name of the strict rule ¬Head(r) → r. The latter is read as follows: if
¬Head(r) follows from a theory, then the rule r should be blocked. This closure
captures simply the fact that the two literals Head(r) and ¬Head(r) cannot hold at
the same time.
Definition 5 (Closed theory). A theory T = (F ,S,D) is closed iff
S is closed under transposition, and
for every r ∈ D such that Head(r) = x, it holds that r′ ∈ S with Rule(r′) =
¬x→ r.
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Example 1 (Cont) The closed version of T1 is T ′1 = (F1,S ′1,D1) such that S ′1 =
{r1, r3, r4} where Rule(r1) = p → ¬f , Rule(r3) = f → ¬p, and Rule(r4) =
¬f → r2.
The backbone of an argumentation system is naturally the notion of arguments.
They are built from a closed theory using the notion of derivation schema.
Definition 6 (Argument). Let T = (F ,S,D) be a closed theory. An argument
defined from T is a pair (d, x) such that:
x ∈ L ∪ L′
d is a derivation schema for x from T
∄T ′ ⊏ (Facts(d), Strict(d), Def(d)) such that x ∈ CN(T ′)
An argument (d, x) is strict iff Def(d) = ∅.
Unlike ASPIC and ASPIC+ systems, arguments are minimal in our system.
This definition of argument is more akin with the intuitive idea that an argument is
a logical proof of a conclusion.
An argument may have several sub-parts, each of which is called sub-argument.
Definition 7 (Sub-argument). An argument (d, x) is a sub-argument of (d′, x′) iff
(Facts(d), Strict(d), Def(d)) ⊑ (Facts(d′), Strict(d′), Def(d′)).
Notations: Arg(T ) denotes the set of all arguments built from theory T in the
sense of Definition 6. If a = (d, x) is an argument, Conc(a) = x and Sub(a) is the
set of all its sub-arguments. For a set E of arguments, Concs(E) = {x | (d, x) ∈ E}
and Th(E) is a theory such that:
Th(E) = (
⋃
(d,x)∈E
Facts(d),
⋃
(d,x)∈E
Strict(d),
⋃
(d,x)∈E
Def(d)).
The undercutting relation is defined as follows:
Definition 8 (Undercutting). Let T = (F ,S,D) be a closed theory and (d, x), (d′, x′) ∈
Arg(T ). The argument (d, x) undercuts the argument (d′, x′), denoted by (d, x)Ru (d′, x′),
iff x ∈ Def(d′).
Let us illustrate this relation by some examples.
Example 1 (Cont) The set Arg(T ′1 ) contains:
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a1 : (〈(b, ∅)〉, b)
a2 : (〈(p, ∅)〉, p)
a3 : (〈(p, ∅), (¬f, r1)〉,¬f)
a4 : (〈(p, ∅), (¬f, r1), (r2, r4)〉, r2)
a5 : (〈(b, ∅), (f, r2)〉, f)
a6 : (〈(b, ∅), (f, r2), (¬p, r3)〉,¬p)
a4 undercuts both a5 and a6 since r2 ∈ Def(d5) and r2 ∈ Def(d6).
Obviously, strict arguments cannot be attacked using this relation.
Proposition 1. Let T = (F ,S,D) be a theory. For any argument a ∈ Arg((F ,S, ∅)),
∄b ∈ Arg(T ) such that bRua.
Note that self-attacking arguments may exist.
Example 2. Consider the closed theory T2 = (F2,S2,D2) such that F2 = {p},
S2 = {r1, r2}, D2 = {r3} with Rule(r1) = t → r3, Rule(r2) = ¬t → r3 and
Rule(r3) = p⇒ t.
The set Arg(T2) contains the three arguments:
a1 : (〈(p, ∅)〉, p)
a2 : (〈(p, ∅), (t, r3)〉, t)
a3 : (〈(p, ∅), (t, r3), (r3, r1)〉, r3)
The argument a3 undercuts itself and a2.
Throughout the paper, we study the following rule-based argumentation system.
Definition 9 (AS). An argumentation system (AS) defined over a closed theory
T = (F ,S,D) is a pair H = (Arg(T ),Ru) where Ru ⊆ Arg(T ) × Arg(T )
and Ru is defined according to Definition 8.
Arguments are evaluated using extension-based semantics proposed by Dung
is his seminal paper [3]. These semantics are based on two key notions:
Conflict-freeness: A set E of arguments is conflict-free iff ∄a, b ∈ E such
that aRub.
Defence: A set E of arguments defends an argument a iff for any argument
b such that bRua, ∃c ∈ E such that cRub.
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Let us now recall the semantics that will be used for evaluating the arguments
of any argumentation system (in the sense of Definition 9).
Definition 10 (Semantics). Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system
defined over a closed theory T , and let E ⊆ Arg(T ).
E is a naive extension iff it is a maximal (with respect to set inclusion)
conflict-free subset of Arg(T ).
E is a complete extension iff it is a conflict-free set which defends all its
elements and contains any argument it defends.
E is a preferred extension iff it is a maximal (with respect to set inclusion)
complete extension.
E is a stable extension iff E is conflict-free and ∀a ∈ Arg(T ) \ E , ∃b ∈ E
such that bRua.
E is a grounded extension iff it the minimal (with respect to set inclusion)
complete extension.
Notations: Exty(H) denotes the set of all extensions of system H under semantics
y where y ∈ {n, p, s, c, g}, n (respectively p, s, c, g) stands for naive (respectively
preferred, stable, complete, grounded).
It is worth recalling that an argumentation system may not have stable exten-
sions, and it has a single grounded extension.
The extensions of a system are used for defining the plausible conclusions to
be drawn from the theory over which the system is built. A literal is a plausible
conclusion iff it is a common conclusion to all the extensions. Note that a similar
definition was used in [16] for drawing conclusions with ASPIC system.
Definition 11 (Plausible conclusions). Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumen-
tation system built over a closed theory T = (F ,S,D). The set of plausible
conclusions of H under semantics y (y ∈ {n, p, s, c, g}) is
Outputy(H) =
{
∅ if Exty(H) = ∅⋂
Ei ∈ Exty(H)
Concs(Ei) else.
It is worth noticing that an argumentation system aims at weakening the infer-
ence power of the consequence operator CN from which the system is built. Indeed,
the inclusion Outputy(H) ⊆ CN(T ) holds. As we will see later, when the theory
T is consistent and coherent the equality Outputy(H) = CN(T ) holds under any
of the recalled semantics. Note also that when the argumentation system has no
extensions, it does not recommend any conclusion as plausible.
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Example 1 (Cont) The argumentation system H1 = (Arg(T ′1 ),Ru) has a single
stable extension which is also preferred: E = {a1, a2, a3, a4}. Thus, Outputs(H1) =
Outputp(H1) = {p, b,¬f, r2}.
Example 2 (Cont) The argumentation system H2 = (Arg(T2),Ru) has a single
preferred extension: E = {a1} and thus Outputp(H2) = {p}. However under
stable semantics, Outputs(H2) = ∅ since Exts(H) = ∅.
Remark: One may wonder why admissible semantics is not investigated in this
paper. The main reason is that, as shown by Dung himself in his paper [3], the
emptyset is an admissible extension of any argumentation system. Consequently,
according to Definition 11, the set of plausible conclusions of any argumentation
system is always empty (Output(H) = ∅) whatever the theory at hand. Even if
the theory T = (F ,S,D) over which the system is built is consistent, the system
will not be able to infer any conclusion, missing thus intuitive conclusions. This
shows that admissible semantics is not suitable for defeasible reasoning.
3. Satisfaction of rationality postulates
Let us now analyze the properties of the argumentation system defined in the
previous section. We show that it satisfies all the rationality postulates proposed
in [16], namely consistency, indirect consistency, and closure under strict rules.
Recall that indirect inconsistency follows from the two other postulates.
Under complete, grounded, preferred and stable semantics, every extension
returns a consistent set of conclusions (unless the strict part of the theory is incon-
sistent) and the set of conclusions of every extension is closed under strict rules,
that is, it is not possible that an extension supports a conclusion x and forgets y if
x → y ∈ S . However, both properties are violated under naive semantics. This is
not surprising since naive semantics does not take into account the orientation of
attacks, and thus the distinction between strict and defeasible rules is neglected.
Theorem 1. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T = (F ,S,D) such that Exty(H) 6= ∅ with y ∈ {s, p, c, g}. For
any E ∈ Exty(H), the following two properties hold:
Concs(E) is consistent iff CN((F ,S, ∅)) is consistent. (Consistency)
Concs(E) = CN((Concs(E),S, ∅)). (Closure under strict rules)
CN((Concs(E),S, ∅)) is consistent iff CN((F ,S, ∅)) is consistent. (Indirect
Consistency)
The following properties follow from the previous theorem.
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Corollary 1. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T = (F ,S,D) such that Exty(H) 6= ∅ with y ∈ {s, p, c, g}. The
following two properties hold:
Outputy(H) is consistent iff CN((F ,S, ∅)) is consistent,
Outputy(H) = CN((Outputy(H),S, ∅)).
In [16, 22] another desirable property, closure under sub-arguments, was dis-
cussed. It states that every extension should contain all the sub-arguments of its
arguments. Hopefully, our system satisfies this property under all the reviewed se-
mantics. It also satisfies a novel property of coherence, which ensures that it is not
possible for an extension to use a defeasible rule in one of its arguments, and at the
same time to block that rule by another argument.
Theorem 2. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T = (F ,S,D) such that Exty(H) 6= ∅, where y ∈ {n, p, s, c, g}.
For any E ∈ Exty(H), the following two properties hold:
For each a ∈ E , Sub(a) ⊆ E . (Closure under sub-arguments)
The theory Th(E) is coherent. (Coherence)
The previous results show that the outcomes of the new argumentation sys-
tem (its extensions and set of plausible conclusions) satisfy nice properties under
grounded, complete, stable and preferred semantics. However, they do not say any-
thing about the kind of conclusions the system draws from a theory. We answer
this question in the next section in which we provide full characterizations of the
system’s outcomes.
4. Formal characterization of extensions and plausible conclusions
This section provides formal characterizations of the outcomes of the system
under the five reviewed semantics. For each semantics, we characterize the exten-
sions in terms of sub-theories of the theory over which the system is built. Indeed,
we show one-to-one correspondences between extensions (under a given seman-
tics) and particular sub-theories of the theory over which the system is built. In
other words, we show that extensions and those sub-theories are the two faces of
the same coin. We also delimit the number of extensions, and characterize the
set of plausible conclusions. As we will see an argumentation system may return
different results under the studied semantics.
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4.1. Naive semantics
A sub-theory that corresponds to a naive extension is called naive option. A
naive option represents the possible states of the world that may be reached in a
theory. Formally, it is a maximal (for set inclusion) sub-theory of the initial theory
that considers all the facts and all the strict and defeasible rules that are applicable
(i.e., their bodies hold).
Definition 12 (Naive option). A naive option of a closed theory T = (F ,S,D) is
a sub-theory (F ′,S ′,D′) such that
F ′ = F , S ′ ⊆ S and D′ ⊆ D
(F ′,S ′,D′) is coherent
∀r ∈ S ′ ∪ D′, Body(r) ⊆ CN((F ′,S ′,D′))
∄S ′′,D′′ such that (F ′,S ′,D′) ⊏ (F ′,S ′′,D′′) and (F ′,S ′′,D′′) satisfies
the previous conditions.
NOpt(T ) denotes the set of naive options of the closed theory T .
Thus, a naive option is obtained by taking all the facts and a maximal (w.r.t.
set inclusion) subset of (strict and defeasible) rules so that the sub-theory remains
coherent and all the added rules are applicable. Notice that no priority is given to
strict rules over defeasible ones. This is explained by the fact that naive semantics
does not distinguish between attackers and attacked arguments.
Example 3. Consider the closed version of theory T3 = (F3,S3,D3) where F3 =
{x, y}, S3 = {r4, r5, r6}, D3 = {r1, r2, r3}, Rule(r1) = x ⇒ t, Rule(r2) =
y ⇒ u, Rule(r3) = t ⇒ s, Rule(r4) = t → r2, Rule(r5) = u → r1, and
Rule(r6) = s→ r3. The theory T3 has three naive options:
On0 = (F3, ∅, {r1, r2, r3}) CN(On0) = {x, y, t, u, s}
On1 = (F3, {r4}, {r1, r3}) CN(On1) = {x, y, t, s, r2}
On2 = (F3, {r5}, {r2}) CN(On2) = {x, y, u, r1}
Let us now establish the relationship between the naive extensions of an argu-
mentation system and the naive options of the closed theory over which the system
is built. Each naive extension returns one naive option and two naive extensions
cannot return the same naive option.
Theorem 3. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T .
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For any E ∈ Extn(H), there exists a single naive optionO ∈ NOpt(T ) such
that Th(E) = O and Concs(E) = CN(O). We define NOption(E) def= O.
For all E , E ′ ∈ Extn(H), if NOption(E) = NOption(E ′) then E = E ′.
For any E ∈ Extn(H), E = Arg(NOption(E)).
The following theorem shows that inversely, each naive option leads to one
naive extension and two different naive options cannot return the same naive ex-
tension.
Theorem 4. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T .
For any O ∈ NOpt(T ), Arg(O) ∈ Extn(H).
For any O ∈ NOpt(T ), O = NOption(Arg(O)).
For all O1,O2 ∈ NOpt(T ), if Arg(O1) = Arg(O2), then O1 = O2.
Let us illustrate the two results on the running example.
Example 3 (Cont) The arguments built from T3 are summarized below.
a1 : (〈(x, ∅)〉, x)
a2 : (〈(y, ∅)〉, y)
a3 : (〈(x, ∅), (t, r1)〉, t)
a4 : (〈(x, ∅), (t, r1), (r2, r4)〉, r2)
a5 : (〈(y, ∅), (u, r2)〉, u)
a6 : (〈(y, ∅), (u, r2), (r1, r5)〉, r1)
a7 : (〈(x, ∅), (t, r1), (s, r3)〉, s)
a8 : (〈(x, ∅), (t, r1), (s, r3), (r3, r6)〉, r3)
The graph of attacks is depicted in Figure 1. It is easy to check that the argu-
mentation system H3 = (Arg(T3),Ru) has three naive extensions:
E0 = {a1, a2, a3, a5, a7},
E1 = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a7} and
E2 = {a1, a2, a5, a6}
which capture the naive options On0, On1 and On2 respectively. Indeed, Th(E0) =
On0 (resp. Th(E1) = On1, Th(E1) = On1) and Concs(E0) = CN(On0) (resp.
Concs(E1) = CN(On1), Concs(E2) = CN(On2)).
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Figure 1: Graph of attacks built from the theory T3
The previous results show a bijection between naive options and naive exten-
sions. Since any argumentation system always admits at least one naive extension
(since at least arguments of the form 〈(p, ∅)〉 where p ∈ F are not attacked), a
closed theory admits at least one naive option (unless the set of facts is empty).
The number of naive extensions is delimited as follows.
Corollary 2. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T . It holds that |Extn(H)| = |NOpt(T )|.
The plausible conclusions of an argumentation system under naive semantics
are the literals that follow from all the naive options of the theory over which the
system is built. Formally:
Corollary 3. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T .
Outputn(H) =
⋂
O∈NOpt(T )
CN(O).
Example 3 (Cont) Under naive semantics, Outputn(H) = CN(On0)∩ CN(On1)∩
CN(On2) = {x, y}.
To conclude, under naive semantics, a rule-based argumentation system infers
the literals that follow from all the options of the closed theory over which the
system is built.
4.2. Stable semantics
The purpose of this section is to characterize the extensions as well as the set
of plausible conclusions of the system described in this paper under stable seman-
tics. As we will show later, the sub-theories of a closed theory that capture stable
extensions are called stable options and are defined as follows:
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Definition 13 (Stable Option). A stable option of a closed theory T = (F ,S,D)
is a sub-theory (F ′,S ′,D′) such that
F ′ = F , S ′ = S and D′ ⊆ D
(F ′,S ′,D′) is coherent
∀r ∈ D′, Body(r) ⊆ CN((F ′,S ′,D′))
∀r /∈ D′ we have: either r ∈ CN((F ′,S ′,D′)) or ∃x ∈ Body(r) such that
x /∈ CN((F ′,S ′,D′))
SOpt(T ) denotes the set of stable options of theory T .
The strict rules of a stable option O = (F ,S,D′) are not necessarily all ap-
plicable. Let S′′ be the subset of strict rules that are applicable in O, i.e., S ′′ =
{r ∈ S | Body(r) ⊆ CN(O)}. Then, the sub-theory O′ = (F ,S ′′,D′) is a naive
option of T which clearly has the same conclusions as O (i.e., CN(O) = CN(O′)).
In addition, every strict (respectively defeasible) rule r which is kept outside O′
is not applicable (respectively is not applicable or is such that r ∈ CN(O′)). The
latter constraint does not hold necessarily for every naive option. Accordingly,
every stable option corresponds to a single naive option but the converse is not
true. Thus, in addition to an “internal condition” (coherence) satisfied by both
naive options and stable options, the latter require an additional “external condi-
tion” which consists of justifying each rule kept outside. Notice, that this idea is
not new in non-monotonic reasoning. We find it namely in the distinction between
Reiter’s extensions [23] and Lukaszewicz’s extensions [24] in default logic as well
as between answer sets [25] and ι-answer sets [26] in logic programming. Let us
illustrate stable options and their relationship with naive options.
Example 3 (Cont) The closed theory T3 has one stable option O = (F3,S3, {r2}).
Note that the only strict rule in S3 which is applicable for O is r5. If we discard
from O the remaining non-applicable strict rules, we get exactly the naive option
On2 and CN(O) = CN(On2). Note also that each rule which is not included in On2
is justified. Namely, the strict rules r4 and r6 are note applicable (t ∈ Body(r4),
t /∈ CN(On2), s ∈ Body(r6), and s /∈ CN(On2)); the defeasible rule r1 is such
that r1 ∈ CN(On2) and the defeasible rule r3 is not applicable (t ∈ Body(r3) and
t /∈ CN(On2)). SoOn2 gives rise to a stable option by adding all the non-applicable
strict rules. This is not the case for On0 and On1. Indeed, adding the missing strict
rules to them leads to incoherent sub-theories.
It is worthy to say that a closed theory may not have stable options. This is
not surprising since as we will show, there is a bijection between the set of stable
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extensions and the set of stable options. Indeed, every stable extension gives birth
to a stable option and two stable extensions cannot return the same stable option.
Theorem 5. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T such that Exts(H) 6= ∅.
For any E ∈ Exts(H), there exists a single stable optionO ∈ SOpt(T ) such
that Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) = CN(O). We define SOption(E) def= O.
For all E , E ′ ∈ Exts(H), if SOption(E) = SOption(E ′) then E = E ′.
For any E ∈ Exts(H), E = Arg(SOption(E)).
Inversely, every stable option leads to one stable extension and two stable op-
tions cannot lead to the same stable extension.
Theorem 6. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T such that Exts(H) 6= ∅.
For any O ∈ SOpt(T ), Arg(O) ∈ Exts(H).
For any O ∈ SOpt(T ), O = SOption(Arg(O)).
For all O1,O2 ∈ SOpt(T ), if Arg(O1) = Arg(O2) then O1 = O2.
Example 3 (Cont) Among the three naive extensions of the argumentation system
H3 built from T3, the only stable extension is E2 = {a1, a2, a5, a6} which captures
the stable option O = (F3,S3, {r2}). Indeed, Th(E2) ⊑ O and Concs(E2) =
CN(O).
We have seen so far that there is a one to one correspondence between naive
(respectively stable) extensions and naive options (respectively stable options). We
have also shown that every stable option is a sub-theory of one naive option. Thus,
the number of stable extensions of a rule-based system is delimited as follows.
Corollary 4. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T . The following inequalities hold:
|Exts(H)| = |SOpt(T )| ≤ |NOpt(T )|.
Under stable semantics, the plausible conclusions of an argumentation system
are the literals that follow from all the stable options of the theory over which the
system is built.
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Corollary 5. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T such that Exts(H) 6= ∅.
Outputs(H) =
⋂
O∈SOpt(T )
CN(O).
Example 3 (Cont) The theory T3 has one stable option O = (F3,S3, {r2}). Thus,
Outputs(H) = CN(O) = {x, y, u, r1}.
Let us summarize: The rule-based argumentation system defined in the pre-
vious section may not have stable extensions, in which case it may miss intuitive
conclusions like facts. When the system has stable extensions, it returns exactly
the literals that follow from all the stable options of the closed theory at hand.
4.3. Preferred semantics
Preferred semantics was proposed in [3] in order to palliate the limit of stable
semantics which does not guarantee the existence of extensions. The family of ar-
gumentation systems we are investigating in this paper suffers from this drawback.
Preferred semantics guarantees extensions. We show next that the sub-theories that
capture preferred extensions are the so-called preferred options.
Definition 14 (Preferred Option). A preferred option of a closed theory T =
(F ,S,D) is a sub-theory (F ′,S ′,D′) s.t.
F ′ = F , S ′ = S and D′ ⊆ D
(F ′,S ′,D′) is coherent
∀r ∈ D′, Body(r) ⊆ CN((F ′,S ′,D′))
∀D′′ ⊆ D, if ∃r′ ∈ D′ such that r′ ∈ CN(F ,S,D′′) then ∃r′′ ∈ D′′ such
that r′′ ∈ CN(F ,S,D′)
∄D′′ such that D′ ⊂ D′′ and (F ′,S ′,D′′) satisfies the previous conditions.
POpt(T ) denotes the set of preferred options of theory T .
Example 3 (Cont) Consider again the closed theory T3. There are three sub-
theories of T3 that satisfy the first four conditions of Definition 16:
Op0 = (F3,S3, ∅),
Op1 = (F3,S3, {r2}),
Op2 = (F3,S3, {r1}).
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The maximal ones (that satisfy also the last condition of Definition 16) areOp1 and
Op2. Notice that Op1 is exactly the unique stable option of T3. The other preferred
option Op2 captures a sub-part of the naive option O2 = (F3, {r4}, {r1, r3}).
Indeed, by keeping inOp2 only the strict rues that are applicable we obtain: Op′2 =
(F3, {r4}, {r1}). We have : Op′2 ⊑ O2 and CN(Op2) = CN(Op′2) ⊆ CN(O2).
The following theorem shows that every preferred extension leads to a single
preferred option.
Theorem 7. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T .
For any E ∈ Extp(H), there exists a single preferred option O ∈ POpt(T )
s.t. Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) = CN(O). We define POption(E) def= O.
For all E , E ′ ∈ Extp(H), if POption(E) = POption(E ′) then E = E ′.
For any E ∈ Extp(H), E = Arg(POption(E)).
Inversely, every preferred option corresponds to a single preferred extension
and two preferred options cannot return the same preferred extension.
Theorem 8. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T .
For any O ∈ POpt(T ), Arg(O) ∈ Extp(H).
For any O ∈ POpt(T ), O = POption(Arg(O)).
For all O1,O2 ∈ POpt(T ), if Arg(O1) = Arg(O2) then O1 = O2.
Example 3 (Cont) The argumentation system H3 constructed from the theory T3
has two preferred extensions:
Ep1 = {a1, a2, a5, a6},
Ep2 = {a1, a2, a3, a4}.
They capture the preferred options Op1 and Op2 respectively. Indeed, Th(Ep1) ⊑
Op1 (resp. Th(Ep2) ⊑ Op2) and Concs(Ep1) = CN(Op1) (resp. Concs(Ep2) =
CN(Op2)).
The number of preferred extensions of an argumentation system H is exactly
the number of preferred options of the closed theory over which the system is built.
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Corollary 6. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T . The following property holds:
|Extp(H)| = |POpt(T )|.
The plausible conclusions of an argumentation system, under preferred seman-
tics, are the literals that follow from all the preferred options of the theory at hand.
Corollary 7. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T .
Outputp(H) =
⋂
O∈POpt(T )
CN(O).
Example 3 (Cont) Outputp(H3) = CN(Op1) ∩ CN(Op2) = {x, y}.
Unlike stable semantics, facts are always plausible consequences under pre-
ferred semantics.
4.4. Complete semantics
Let us now define the sub-theories corresponding to complete extensions, we
call them complete options.
Definition 15 (Complete Option). A complete option of a closed theory T =
(F ,S,D) is a sub-theory (F ′,S ′,D′) s.t.
F ′ = F , S ′ = S and D′ ⊆ D
(F ′,S ′,D′) is coherent
∀r ∈ D′, Body(r) ⊆ CN((F ′,S ′,D′))
∀D′′ ⊆ D, if ∃r′ ∈ D′ such that r′ ∈ CN(F ,S,D′′) then ∃r′′ ∈ D′′ such
that r′′ ∈ CN(F ,S,D′)
∀r /∈ D′, ∀D1 ⊆ D such that r ∈ D1 and Body(r) ⊆ CN(F ,S,D1),
∃D′′ ⊆ D,D1 ∩ CN(F ,S,D
′′) 6= ∅ and ∀r′′ ∈ D′′, r′′ /∈ CN(F ′,S ′,D′)
COpt(T ) denotes the set of complete options of theory T .
Example 3 (Cont) Consider again the closed theory T3. There are three complete
options of T3:
Oc0 = (F3,S3, ∅),
Oc1 = (F3,S3, {r2}),
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Oc2 = (F3,S3, {r1}).
Let us show for instance that Oc0 is a complete option of T3. The first four con-
ditions are clearly satisfied. Let us show that the fifth condition holds for the three
rules r1, r2 and r3. Let us start by r1 and let D1 = {r1}, we have r1 ∈ D1 and
Body(r1) ⊆ CN(F ,S,D1). Take D′′ = {r2}, we have D1 ∩ CN(F ,S,D′′) =
{r1} 6= ∅ and r2 /∈ CN(F ′,S ′, ∅). A similar reasoning is valid for the other choices
of D1, namely for D1 = {r1, r2}, D1 = {r1, r3} and D1 = {r1, r2, r3}.
We show that every complete extension leads to a complete option and two
complete extensions cannot return the same complete option.
Theorem 9. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T .
For any E ∈ Extc(H), there exists a single complete option O ∈ COpt(T )
such that Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) = CN(O). Let COption(E) def= O.
For all E , E ′ ∈ Extc(H), if COption(E) = COption(E ′) then E = E ′.
For any E ∈ Extc(H), E = Arg(COption(E)).
Inversely, every complete option corresponds to a single complete extension
and two complete options cannot return the same complete extension.
Theorem 10. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T .
For any O ∈ COpt(T ), Arg(O) ∈ Extc(H).
For any O ∈ COpt(T ), O = COption(Arg(O)).
For all O1,O2 ∈ COpt(T ), if Arg(O1) = Arg(O2) then O1 = O2.
Example 3 (Cont) The argumentation system H3 constructed from T3 has three
complete extensions:
Ec0 = {a1, a2},
Ec1 = {a1, a2, a5, a6} and
Ec2 = {a1, a2, a3, a4}.
They capture the complete optionsOc0,Oc1 andOc2 respectively. Indeed, Th(Ec0) ⊑
Oc0 (resp. Th(Ec1) ⊑ Oc1, Th(Ec2) ⊑ Oc2) and Concs(Ec0) = CN(Oc0) (resp.
Concs(Ec1) = CN(Oc1), Concs(Ec2) = CN(Oc2)).
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From the bijection between the set of complete extensions and the set of com-
plete options, it follows that the number of complete extensions of an argumenta-
tion system H is exactly the number of complete options of the theory over which
the system is built.
Corollary 8. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T . It holds that
|Extc(H)| = |COpt(T )|.
The plausible conclusions of an argumentation system, under complete seman-
tics, are the literals that follow from all the complete options of the theory at hand.
Corollary 9. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T .
Outputc(H) =
⋂
O∈COpt(T )
CN(O).
Example 3 (Cont) Outputc(H3) = CN(Oc0) ∩ CN(Oc1) ∩ CN(Oc2) = {x, y}.
4.5. Grounded semantics
We introduce in this section the sub-theory, called grounded option, which cor-
responds to the grounded extension of an argumentation system. It is the minimal
(for set inclusion) complete option.
Definition 16 (Grounded Option). The grounded option of a closed theory T =
(F ,S,D) is the sub-theory (F ′,S ′,D′) such that
(F ′,S ′,D′) is a complete option,
∄D′′ ⊂ D′ such that (F ′,S ′,D′′) is a complete option.
GOpt(T ) denotes the grounded option of theory T .
Example 3 (Cont) There are three complete options of T3: Oc0 = (F3,S3, ∅),
Oc1 = (F3,S3, {r2}) and Oc2 = (F3,S3, {r1}). Clearly, Oc3 is the grounded
option (i.e., GOpt(T3) = Oc3) since it has the minimal (wrt set inclusion) set of
defeasible rules.
Now, let us show that the grounded extension leads to the grounded option, and
from the grounded option, one can get the grounded extension.
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Stable Option Naive Option
Preferred Option
Complete Option Grounded Option
Figure 2: Relationships between options (plain arrows) (resp. outputs (dotted arrows)).
Theorem 11. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T . Let E be the grounded extension of H. The following two proper-
ties hold.
Th(E) ⊑ GOpt(T ) and Concs(E) = CN(GOpt(T )).
E = Arg(GOpt(T )).
Example 3 (Cont) The grounded extension of the system H3 constructed from T3
is: E = {a1, a2}. It captures the grounded option Oc3. Indeed, Th(E) ⊑ Oc3 and
Concs(E) = CN(Oc3).
The plausible conclusions of an argumentation system, under grounded seman-
tics, are the literals that follow from the grounded option of the theory at hand.
Corollary 10. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built over a
closed theory T . Outputg(H) = CN(GOpt(T )).
Example 3 (Cont) Outputg(H3) = CN(Oc3) = {x, y}.
4.6. Relationships between the different kinds of options and their outputs
From the one to one correspondences established in theorems 3-11, it follows
that the same well-known relationships between the extensions of the five seman-
tics exist between the five families of options. Figure 2 depicts the relationships
between the different kinds of options and their outputs. A plain (respectively dot-
ted) arrow from X-Option to Y-Options means that every X option is a Y Option
(respectively OutputX(.) ⊆ OutputY (.)).
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5. Conclusion
There are a couple of rule-based argumentation systems in the literature. Some
of them like ASPIC and its extended version ASPIC+ are shown to satisfy the
rationality postulates defined in [16], namely the consistency and closure under
strict rules of their sets of plausible conclusions. While this is testimony to some
strength of these formalisms, it does not say anything about the kind of plausible
conclusions they draw from a theory. Surprisingly, the outputs of these systems
(their extensions and their plausible conclusions) have never been characterized.
The authors of those systems provide only examples to show that the outputs are
meaningful. This is certainly not sufficient. Our paper is the first that attempts
a systematic study of the outcomes of rule-based systems under naive, grounded,
complete, stable and preferred semantics. There are two notable exceptions. The
first work, done in [19], considered a fragment of our logical language and rebuttal
as attack relation. Blocking rules was not allowed. Extensions were characterized
in terms of sub-theories. However, some sub-theories may not have corresponding
extensions. Thus, there is no bijection between the two. Our formalism is thus
more general and our characterizations of its outcomes are more accurate since
they are one-to-one correspondences. The second work, done in [27, 28], investi-
gated the link between logic programming semantics and argumentation ones. The
theory over which an argumentation system is built is a logic program, that is, only
one type of rules is used. The paper shows that Dung’s semantics have counter-
parts in logic programming. Another well-known argumentation system is ABA
[2]. Unlike all other rule-based argumentation systems, the initial version of ABA
is not based on the notion of argument. It manipulates sets of assumptions and the
attack relation is between pairs of assumption sets. In [29], the authors proposed
an equivalent version which makes use of arguments. The logical language con-
sidered in ABA is different from ours since it uses assumptions while in our paper
we do not. As argued in [30], ABA does not satisfy in general the consistency
postulate while our system satisfies all the postulates proposed in [16]. Finally, we
fully characterized the plausible conclusions of our system under various semantics
while such characterization is not available for ABA. In [31] another system was
proposed for reasoning about stratified default theories. Like the initial version of
ABA, the system is not based on the notion of argument thus somehow different
from our approach. It allows subsets of a theory to attack a given default. Stable
semantics was used for solving the conflicts. Unlike our paper, no characterization
results are provided. However, the authors have shown that their system satisfies
basic properties of a nonmonotonic consequence relation such as deduction, con-
ditioning, and cumulativity.
In addition to the characterizations of the system’s outcomes, the other main
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novelty of our paper is the exclusive use of undercut for encoding conflicts between
arguments. This relation is always coupled with rebuttal and/or assumption attack
which handle inconsistency in other systems. In our paper, we have shown that
undercut is powerful enough to perfectly fulfill the role of rebuttal. Indeed, the
characterization results show that extensions under any of the reviewed semantics
are consistent and coherent sub-theories. This means that they do not contain pairs
of arguments which are in conflict wrt one of the two relations. Furthermore, the
maximality for set inclusion in case of naive, preferred and stable semantics sug-
gests that not only all possible conflicts are captured but are also correctly solved.
Finally, the system satisfies all the rationality postulates under any semantics while
in ASPIC and ASPIC+, for each semantics, one should use a different definition of
rebuttal (restricted vs unrestricted) in order to satisfy the postulates.
Regarding the definition of undercut, there are three proposals in the literature
which are all equivalent. The first definition is the one followed in our paper and
in [10]. The idea is to assign a name to every defeasible rule and to allow these
names to be in heads of other rules. Unlike in [10], in our paper, names of rules
may only be in heads of strict rules. The reason is that undercut shows exceptions
of defeasible rules, and exceptions are certain information. For instance, in case of
penguin, the rule “birds fly” is not applicable. The second proposal, given in [17]
and followed in [16], uses an objectivation operator which transforms any defeasi-
ble rule into a literal. The latter plays the role of the name of the rule in our system.
The last definition, proposed in [32, 33, 34], extends the logical language by a new
form of rules with which one can block defeasible rules. Whatever the definition
is, none of these systems characterized its outcomes.
This work will be extended in two ways. First, we will consider weighted the-
ories, i.e., theories in which defeasible rules may not have the same importance.
Second, we plan to use ranking semantics [4] for evaluating arguments. Such se-
mantics were already used in argumentation systems developed for handling in-
consistency in propositional knowledge bases [35]. The results show that they lead
to more discriminating results than those of extension semantics. Furthermore, the
argumentation approach goes beyond the maximal consistent subbases computed
by the well-known coherence-based approach [36].
References
[1] L. Amgoud, F. Nouioua, Undercutting in argumentation systems, in: 9th
International Conference on Scalable Uncertainty Management, SUM’15,
2015, pp. 267–281.
24
[2] A. Bondarenko, P. Dung, R. Kowalski, F. Toni, An abstract, argumentation-
theoretic approach to default reasoning, Artificial Intelligence 93 (1997) 63–
101.
[3] P. Dung, On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in non-
monotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games, Artificial In-
telligence Journal 77 (2) (1995) 321–357.
[4] L. Amgoud, J. Ben-Naim, Ranking-based semantics for argumentation
frameworks, in: 7th International Conference on Scalable Uncertainty Man-
agement (SUM’13), Vol. 8078, 2013, pp. 134–147.
[5] C. Cayrol, M. Lagasquie-Schiex, Graduality in argumentation, Journal of Ar-
tificial Intelligence Research 23 (2005) 245–297.
[6] L. Amgoud, C. Cayrol, Inferring from inconsistency in preference-based
argumentation frameworks, International Journal of Automated Reasoning
29 (2) (2002) 125–169.
[7] N. Gorogiannis, A. Hunter, Instantiating abstract argumentation with classi-
cal logic arguments: Postulates and properties, Artificial Intelligence Journal
175 (9-10) (2011) 1479–1497.
[8] L. Amgoud, P. Besnard, Logical limits of abstract argumentation frameworks,
Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 23, N-3 (2013) 229–267.
[9] L. Amgoud, M. Caminada, C. Cayrol, M.-C. Lagasquie, H. Prakken, Towards
a consensual formal model: inference part, Deliverable of ASPIC project.
[10] H. Prakken, An abstract framework for argumentation with structured argu-
ments, Journal of Argument and Computation 1 (2) (2010) 93–124.
[11] A. Garcı´a, G. Simari, Defeasible logic programming: an argumentative ap-
proach, Theory and Practice of Logic Programming 4 (1-2) (2004) 95–138.
[12] G. Governatori, M. Maher, G. Antoniou, D. Billington, Argumentation se-
mantics for defeasible logic, Journal of Logic and Computation 14 (5) (2004)
675–702.
[13] A. Wyner, T. Bench-Capon, P. Dunne, On the instantiation of knowledge
bases in abstract argumentation frameworks, in: Proceedings of the 14th
International Workshop on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems,
CLIMA XIV, 2013, pp. 34–50.
25
[14] A. Wyner, T. Bench-Capon, P. Dunne, F. Cerutti, Senses of ’argument’ in in-
stantiated argumentation frameworks, Argument & Computation 6 (1) (2015)
50–72.
[15] H. Strass, Instantiating knowledge bases in abstract dialectical frameworks,
in: Proceedings of the 14th International Workshop on Computational Logic
in Multi-Agent Systems, CLIMA XIV, 2013, pp. 86–101.
[16] M. Caminada, L. Amgoud, On the evaluation of argumentation formalisms,
Artificial Intelligence Journal 171 (5-6) (2007) 286–310.
[17] J. Pollock, How to reason defeasibly, Artificial Intelligence Journal 57 (1)
(1992) 1–42.
[18] M. Elvang-Gøransson, J. Fox, P. Krause, Acceptability of arguments as ‘logi-
cal uncertainty’, in: 2nd European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative
Approaches to Reasoning and Uncertainty (ECSQARU’93), Vol. 747 of Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, Granada, Spain, 1993, pp. 85–90.
[19] L. Amgoud, P. Besnard, A formal characterization of the outcomes of rule-
based argumentation systems, in: 7th International Conference on Scalable
Uncertainty Management SUM’13, 2013, pp. 78–91.
[20] S. Benferhat, F. Bannay, Contextual handling of conditional knowledge, in:
6th International Conference on Information Processing and Management of
Uncertainty in Knowledge-Based Systems IPMU’96, 1996, pp. 1–7.
[21] H. Lam, G. Governatori, What are the necessity rules in defeasible reason-
ing?, in: Volume 6645 of the series Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2011,
pp. 187–192.
[22] L. Amgoud, Postulates for logic-based argumentation systems, International
Journal of Approximate Reasoning 55 (9) (2014) 2028–2048.
[23] R. Reiter, A logic for default reasoning, Artificial Intelligence Journal 13 (1-
2) (1980) 81–132.
[24] W. Lukaszewicz, Considerations on default logic : An alternative approach,
Computational Intelligence 4 (1988) 1–16.
[25] M. Gelfond, V. Lifschitz, Classical negation in logic programs and disjunctive
databases, New Generation Computing 9 (1991) 365–385.
[26] M. Gebser, M. Gharib, R. Mercer, T. Schaub, Monotonic answer set program-
ming, Journal of Logic and Computation 19 (4) (2009) 539–564.
26
[27] M. Caminada, S. Sa´, J. Alcaˆntara, On the equivalence between logic pro-
gramming semantics and argumentation semantics, in: 12th European Con-
ference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncer-
tainty ECSQARU’13, 2013, pp. 97–108.
[28] M. Caminada, S. Sa´, J. Alcaˆntara, W. Dvora´k, On the equivalence between
logic programming semantics and argumentation semantics, International
Journal of Approximate Reasoning 58 (2015) 87–111.
[29] D. Gaertner, F. Toni, Computing arguments and attacks in assumption-based
argumentation, IEEE Intelligent Systems 22 (6) (2007) 24–33.
[30] S. Modgil, H. Prakken, A general account of argumentation with preferences,
Artificial Intelligence 195 (2013) 361–397.
[31] P. M. Dung, T. C. Son, An argument-based approach to reasoning with speci-
ficity, Artif. Intell. 133 (1-2) (2001) 35–85.
[32] A. Cohen, A. Garcı´a, G. Simari, Backing and undercutting in defeasible logic
programming, in: 11th European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative
Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty, ECSQARU’11, 2011, pp. 50–61.
[33] A. Cohen, A. Garcı´a, G. Simari, Backing and undercutting in abstract argu-
mentation frameworks, in: 7th International Conference on Foundations of
Information and Knowledge Systems, FoIKS’12, 2012, pp. 107–123.
[34] A. Cohen, A. Garcı´a, G. Simari, A structured argumentation system with
backing and undercutting, Engineering Applications of AI 49 (2016) 149–
166.
[35] L. Amgoud, J. Ben-Naim, Argumentation-based ranking logics, in: Proceed-
ings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Mul-
tiagent Systems, AAMAS’2015, 2015, pp. 1511–1519.
[36] N. Rescher, R. Manor, On inference from inconsistent premises, Journal of
Theory and Decision 1 (1970) 179–219.
Acknowledgments.
This work benefited from the support of AMANDE ANR-13-BS02-0004 and
ASPIQ ANR-12-BS02-0003 projects of the French National Research Agency.
27
Appendix: Proofs
Notations: Throughout this section, when we do not need to refer to a particular
semantics, we write Ext(H) to denote the set of extensions of the argumentation
system H. The function Name returns the name of a (strict or defeasible) rule.
Proof of Proposition 1. Follows immediately from the fact that Def(d) = ∅ for all
(d, x) ∈ Arg((F ,S, ∅)).
Proof of Theorem 1. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built
over theory T = (F ,S,D). Assume that Ext(H) 6= ∅ and let E ∈ Ext(H).
Closure under strict rules: Let E ∈ Extc(H). Assume that x ∈ CN((Concs(E),S, ∅))
and x /∈ Concs(E). Let X = {x1, . . . , xn} be the minimal for set inclusion sub-
set of Concs(E) such that x ∈ CN((X,S, ∅)). For each xi, there exists ai ∈ E
such that Conc(ai) = xi. There exists a minimal derivation schema for x using
a1, . . . , an and additional strict rules. Let d be that derivation. (d, x) is an ar-
gument and (d, x) /∈ E . There are two cases: i) E ∪ {(d, x)} is conflicting, i.e,
there exists b = (d′, x′) ∈ E such that bRu(d, x) or (d, x)Rub. If bRu(d, x),
then Conc(b) ∈ Def(d). However, Def(d) = ∪Def(ai). Thus, there exists
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Conc(b) ∈ Def(ai), i.e., bRuai. This contradicts the
fact that E is conflict-free. If (d, x)Rub, then since E defends its elements, ∃c ∈ E
such that cRu(d, x), i.e., Conc(c) ∈ Def(d). Then, ∃ai ∈ Sub((d, x)) such that
cRuai. But, ai ∈ E . ii) E does not defend (d, x). Let b ∈ Arg(T ) such that
bRu(d, x). Then, Conc(b) ∈ Def(d). Then, bRai for some ai ∈ Sub((d, x)) and
ai ∈ E . Since E defends its elements, then E attacks b. Since preferred, grounded
and stable extensions are complete, then the property holds under those semantics
as well.
Consistency: Let E ∈ Exty(H) where y ∈ {p, s, g, c}, and assume that Concs(E)
is inconsistent. Thus, ∃a, b ∈ E such that a = (d, x), b = (d′,¬x), d =
〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉, d
′ = 〈(x′1, r
′
1), . . . , (x
′
m, r
′
m)〉, xn = x and x′m = ¬x.
Moreover, x,¬x ∈ L.
If a and b are both strict (i.e., Def(d) = ∅ and Def(d′) = ∅), then CN((F ,S, ∅))
is inconsistent. Assume now that CN((F ,S, ∅)) is consistent. It follows that a
or/and b is defeasible (i.e., Def(d) 6= ∅ or/and Def(d′) 6= ∅). Assume that a is
defeasible. If rn ∈ D, then Name(¬x → rn) ∈ S (since T is closed). Since
E is closed under strict rules and ¬x ∈ Concs(E), then rn ∈ Concs(E). Thus,
CN(Th(E)) ∩ Defs(Th(E)) 6= ∅. This contradicts the fact that Th(E) is coherent
by Theorem 2. Assume now that rn /∈ D. Let ri ∈ Def(d) be such that for all
j > i, rj is either a fact or a strict rule. By definition of a derivation, rn ∈ S .
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Let rn = y1, . . . , yl → x. Since S is closed under contraposition, then for all
1 ≤ j ≤ l, Name(y1, . . . , yj−1, yj+1, . . . , yl → ¬yj) ∈ S . Moreover, there exists a
minimal sub-derivation dj of d for each yj . Thus,
Xj = 〈d1, dj−1, dj+1, . . . , dl, d
′, (¬yj, y1, yj−1, yj+1, . . . , yl → ¬yj,¬yj)〉
is a derivation of ¬yj . Since arguments are minimal, then (Xj ,¬yj) ∈ Arg(T ).
Note that (di, yi) ∈ Sub(a). SinceH is closed under sub-arguments, then (di, yi) ∈
E and thus yi ∈ Concs(E). Since H is closed under strict rules, ¬yj ∈ Concs(E)
for all j = 1, . . . , l.
The same reasoning holds for each strict rule y1, . . . , yl → y between ri and
rn. Indeed, ¬yi ∈ Concs(E) for all i = 1, . . . , l. By definition of derivation,
there exists a strict rule r after ri such that Head(ri) ∈ Body(r) thus ¬Head(ri) ∈
Concs(E). Thus, Name(¬Head(ri) → ri) ∈ S . Since H is closed under strict
rules, ri ∈ Concs(E). But, ri ∈ Defs(E) (since ri ∈ Def(d)). This contradicts the
fact that Th(E) is coherent by Theorem 2.
Indirect consistency: If CN((F ,S, ∅)) is inconsistent, we have seen that consis-
tency is violated, i.e., there exists at least one extension E such that Concs(E)
is inconsistent. Since by monotony of CN, Concs(E) ⊆ CN(Concs(E)). Hence,
CN(Concs(E)) is inconsistent, and indirect consistency is violated. Assume now
that CN((F ,S, ∅)) is consistent. From previous result, consistency is satisfied. We
know also that closure under strict rules is satisfied. Then, indirect consistency is
satisfied, since it was shown in [16] that indirect consistency follows from Consis-
tency and Closure under strict rules.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built
over theory T = (F ,S,D). Assume that Ext(H) 6= ∅ and let E ∈ Ext(H).
Coherence: Assume that ∃x ∈ Concs(E) ∩ Defs(Th(E)). Thus, x ∈ L′. More-
over, ∃a, b ∈ E such that Conc(a) = x and x ∈ Defs({b}). Then, aRub. This
contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free.
Closure under sub-arguments: Let a = (d, x), b = (d′, x′) ∈ Arg(T ) such that
a ∈ E , b /∈ E and b ∈ Sub(a).
Assume that E ∈ Exts(H). There exists c ∈ E such that cRub. Let c =
(d′′, x′′). Then, x′′ ∈ Def(d′) and thus x′′ ∈ Def(d) since Def(d′) ⊆ Def(d).
Consequently, cRua. This contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free.
Assume now that E ∈ Extn(H), then E ∪ {b} is conflicting. Then, there exists
c ∈ E such that cRub or bRuc. Assume that bRuc. Then x′ ∈ L′. Since elements
of L′ cannot be in the body of any rule then a = b, thus aRuc. This contradicts the
fact that it is conflict-free. Assume now that cRub. As above, it follows that cRua
and this contradicts the fact that E is conflict-free.
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Assume now that E ∈ Extc(H). Since b /∈ E then there are two cases: i) E∪{b}
is conflicting, i.e., there exists c ∈ E such that cRub or bRuc. As above, we get
either cRua or aRuc. In both cases, E is not conflict-free and this contradicts
the fact that it is a complete extension. ii) E does not defend b. Thus, there exists
c = (d′′, x′′) ∈ Arg(T ) such that cRub. Then, x′′ ∈ Def(d′) and thus x′′ ∈ Def(d)
meaning that cRua. Since E is a complete extension ∃d ∈ E such that dRuc.
Thus, E defends b. Since grounded and preferred extensions are complete, then the
property holds under the two semantics as well.
Proof of Corollary 1. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an argumentation system built
over a closed theory T = (F ,S,D) s.t. Ext(H) 6= ∅. Assume that Output(H)
is inconsistent then ∃x,¬x ∈ Output(H). Thus, for all E ∈ Ext(H), x,¬x ∈
Concs(E). From Theorem 1, this is only possible if CN((F ,S, ∅)) is inconsistent.
Since CN is monotonic, Output(H) ⊆ CN((Output(H),S, ∅)).
Let x ∈ CN((Output(H),S, ∅)) and assume that x /∈ Output(H), thus, there
exists E ∈ Ext(H) such that x /∈ Concs(E). This contradicts Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be a system built over a theory T .
Let E ∈ Extn(H) and let O = Th(E). It is clear that O is uniquely de-
termined from E . Let us show that O is a naive option. O = (F ′,S ′,D′)
such that F ′ =
⋃
(d,x)∈E Facts(d), S
′ =
⋃
(d,x)∈E Strict(d) and D′ =⋃
(d,x)∈E Def(d).
It is obvious that S ′ ⊆ S andD′ ⊆ D. Now, for every x ∈ F there is an
argument (〈(x, ∅)〉 , x) ∈ Arg(T ). By definition of undercutting, such
argument has no conflict with any other argument. Thus, all arguments
of this form belong to every naive extension, i.e., F ′ = F .
For the sake of contradiction, suppose that ∃x ∈ CN(F ′,S ′,D′) s.t.
x ∈ D′. Let d be a minimal derivation of x in O. Thus (d, x) is an
argument of E . since x ∈ D′ then, from the definition of Th(E), x must
be used in at least an argument of E , say (d′, x′), i.e., x ∈ d′. Therefore,
(d, x)Ru(d
′, x′). Contradiction with conflict-freeness of E .
Let r ∈ S ′ ∪ D′. r is used in at least one argument, say a, of E . So, a
has a sub-argument b = (〈(x1, r1), . . . , (xn, rn)〉 , xn) with rn = r and
xn = Head(r). By closeness under sub-arguments (by Theorem 2), b
is also an argument of E . From the definition of derivation schema, for
every x ∈ Body(r), x = xi for some i s.t. 1 ≤ i < n. Thus, there
is a sub-argument of b, and hence an argument in E and a derivation in
O, for every x ∈ Body(r). This means that for every x ∈ Body(r),
x ∈ CN(O), i.e., Body(r) ⊆ CN(O).
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Suppose that ∃S ′′,D′′ s.t. (F ′,S ′,D′) ⊏ (F ′,S ′′,D′′) and (F ′,S ′′,D′′)
satisfies the previous conditions. For every rule r ∈ (S ′′ ∪D′′) \ (S ′ ∪
D′), there is at least an argument a = (d, x) s.t. r ∈ Strict(d) ∪
Def(d). Clearly, a /∈ E . But from the coherence of (F ′,S ′′,D′′) it
must be the case that ∄b ∈ E s.t. aRub or bRua. Indeed, suppose
for example that aRub and that b = (d′, x′), then x ∈ d′. That is,
x ∈ CN(F ′,S ′′,D′′) and x ∈ D′′ which contradicts the coherence of
(F ′,S ′′,D′′). We can show in a similar way that it must not be the case
that bRua. But, it this case E ∪ a is conflict-free. Contradiction with
the fact that E is a naive extension.
Let E , E ′ ∈ Extn(H) and NOption(E) = NOption(E ′). Let us show that
E ⊆ E ′. Let a = (d, x) ∈ E . Then, d is a derivation for x in NOption(E).
Suppose that a /∈ E ′. Then d is not a derivation for x in NOption(E ′).
Contradiction, since NOption(E) = NOption(E ′). We show similarly that
E ′ ⊆ E .
Let E ∈ Extn(H). Since NOption(E) = Th(E) and from the defini-
tion of functions Th and Arg it is obvious that E ⊆ Arg(NOption(E)).
Now let a = (d, x) ∈ Arg(NOption(E)). This means that a = (d, x) is
constructed from NOption(E). So, x ∈ CN(NOption(E)) and Def(d) ⊆
Defs(NOption(E)). Suppose that a /∈ E . Since E is a naive extension then
there is b = (d′, x′) ∈ E such that aRub or bRua. From b ∈ E we easily
deduce that x′ ∈ CN(NOption(E)) and Def(d′) ⊆ Defs(NOption(E)). But
then, from aRub or bRua, NOption(E) must be incoherent. Contradiction
with the fact that NOption(E) is a naive option.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) be a system built over a theory T .
Let O = (F ,S ′,D′) ∈ NOpt(T ) and let E = Arg(O). We prove that E is a
maximal conflict-free set of Arg(T ).
Suppose that there are two arguments a = (d, x) and b = (d′, x′) in E s.t.
aRub, i.e., x ∈ Def(d′). But since d and d′ are derivation schemas for x and
x′ respectively in O we have: x ∈ CN(O) and Def(d′) ⊆ D′, so x ∈ D′.
Contradiction with the coherence of naive optionO. E = Arg(O) is conflict-
free.
Now, suppose that E is not maximal. Thus there is E ′ ⊆ Arg(T ) s.t. E ⊂
E ′ and E ′ is a naive extension of H. From Theorem 3, NOption(E ′) =
Th(E ′) = O′ is a naive option of T . Let O′ = (F ,S ′′,D′′). Since all
the arguments that use exclusively rules from S ′ ∪ D′ belong to E , every
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argument in E ′ \ E uses at least a rule r which is not in S ′ ∪ D′. So, either
(S ′ ⊂ S ′′) or (D′ ⊂ D′′) or both, i.e, O ⊏ O′. Contradiction with the fact
that O is a naive option of T .
LetO = (F ,S ′,D′) ∈ NOpt(T ) and let NOption(Arg(O)) = (F ′′,S ′′,D′′).
F ′′ = F follows from the fact that Arg(O) contains every argument (〈x, ∅〉 , x).
Let x ∈ S ′′ (resp. x ∈ D′′). x is used in at least an argument of Arg(O), so
x ∈ S ′ (resp. x ∈ D′). Thus, we have: S ′′ ⊆ S ′ and D′′ ⊆ D′. Inversely,
let x ∈ S ′(resp. x ∈ D′), since Body(x) ⊆ CN(O) (from the definition of
a naive option), x must be used in at least one argument of Arg(O). Thus
x ∈ F ′′ (resp. x ∈ D′′). So, F ′ ⊆ F ′′ and D′ ⊆ D′′. In summary, F = F ′′,
S ′ = S ′′ and D′ = D′′, i.e., O = NOption(Arg(O)).
LetO1 = (F ,S ′1,D′1) andO2 = (F ,S ′2,D′2) be two naive options. Suppose
that O1 6= O2, i.e., either S ′1 6= S ′2 or D′1 6= D′2 or both. Suppose that
S ′1 6= S
′
2. This means that either there is x s.t. x ∈ S ′1 and x /∈ S ′2 or there is
x s.t. x ∈ S ′2 and x /∈ S ′1. Suppose the first case. Then, x is used in at least an
argument of Arg(O1) and never used in Arg(O2). So, Arg(O1) 6= Arg(O2).
By a similar reasoning, we obtain the same conclusion for the other case
(there is x s.t. x ∈ S ′2 and x /∈ S ′1) and for the case of defeasible rules.
Proof of Corollary 2. Follows immediately from the bijection between naive op-
tions and naive extensions (Theorems 3 - 4).
Proof of Corollary 3. Follows immediately from the bijection between naive op-
tions and naive extensions (Theorems 3 - 4).
Proof of Theorem 5. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) s.t. Exts(H) 6= ∅.
Let us show that for all E ∈ Exts(H), there is a unique O ∈ SOpt(T ) s.t.
Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) = CN(O).
Let E ∈ Exts(H) and let Th(E) = (F ′,S ′,D′). We can show that F ′ = F
in a similar way as in Theorem 3, first point. We take O = (F ,S,D′)
(we complete S ′ by the remaining strict rules). Clearly, O is uniquely de-
termined from E . We have that Concs(E) = CN(Th(E)). Let us show that
CN((F ,S,D′)) = CN(Th(E)). To do so, it is sufficient to show that every
rule r ∈ S \ S ′ is not applicable in (F ,S ′,D′). Suppose for the sake of
contradiction that there is r ∈ S \ S ′ s.t. r is applicable in (F ,S ′,D′),
i.e. Body(r) ⊆ CN((F ,S ′,D′)). Thus, there is a minimal derivation in
(F ,S,D′) for Head(r) using r as a last rule: 〈d, (x, r)〉 s.t. x = Head(r),
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Def(d) ⊆ D′ and Strict(d) ⊆ S ′. Thus, a = (〈d, (x, r)〉 , x) is an argu-
ment outside E but since E is a stable extension, there is b ∈ E s.t. bRua.
So, there is a sub-argument of a: a′ = (〈d′, (x′, r′)〉 , x′) with r′ ∈ D′ and
b = (d′′, r′). However since a′ ∈ E (because it uses only rules from S ′∪D′),
this means that E is not conflict-free. Contradiction. Now let us prove that
O = (F ,S,D′) is a stable option.
It is obvious that D′ ⊆ D
Similar to the proof of point 2 in Theorem 3.
Similar to the proof of point 3 in Theorem 3.
Suppose that ∃r /∈ D′ s.t. r /∈ CN((F ,S,D′)) and ∀x ∈ Body(r), x ∈
CN((F ,S,D′)). Let Body(r) = {x1, . . . , xk} and Head(r) = y. Since
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, xi ∈ CN((F ,S,D′)), then there is an argument
ai = (di, xi) ∈ E (1 ≤ i ≤ k) for each xi. Thus, we can con-
struct an argument a for y using r as last rule, i.e., a = (〈d, (y, r)〉 , y)
where Facts(d) =
⋃
i Facts(di), Strict(d) =
⋃
i Strict(di) and
Def(d) =
⋃
i Def(di). Since r /∈ D′, a /∈ E , so there is b = (d′, x′) ∈
E s.t. bRua, i.e., x′ ∈ Def(d) ∪ {r}. Since r /∈ CN((F ,S,D′)), it
cannot be the case that x′ = r, thus x′ ∈ Def(d), so x′ ∈ Def(di) for
some i s.t. 1 ≤ i ≤ k. This means that bRuai which contradicts the
conflict-freeness of E .
Let E , E ′ ∈ Exts(H) and SOption(E) = SOption(E ′). Let us show that
E ⊆ E ′. Let a = (d, x) ∈ E . Then, d is a derivation for x in SOption(E).
Suppose that a /∈ E ′. Then d is not a derivation for x in SOption(E ′).
Contradiction, since SOption(E) = SOption(E ′). We show similarly that
E ′ ⊆ E .
Let E ∈ Exts(H). Since Th(E) ⊑ SOption(E) and from the defini-
tion of functions Th and Arg it is obvious that E ⊆ Arg(SOption(E)).
Now let a = (d, x) ∈ Arg(SOption(E)). a = (d, x) is constructed from
SOption(E). So, Def(d) ⊆ Defs(SOption(E)). Suppose that a /∈ E .
Since E is a stable extension then there is b = (d′, x′) ∈ E such that bRua.
From b ∈ E we easily deduce that x′ ∈ CN(SOption(E)). But then, from
bRua, SOption(E) must be incoherent. Contradiction with the fact that
SOption(E) is a stable option.
Proof of Theorem 6. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) s.t. Exts(H) 6= ∅.
Let O = (F ,S,D′) ∈ SOpt(T ) and let E = Arg(O). We prove that E is
conflict-free and ∀b ∈ Arg(T ) \ E , ∃a ∈ E s.t. aRub.
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Suppose that there are two argument a = (d, x) and b = (d′, x′) in E s.t.
aRub, i.e., x ∈ Def(d′). But since d and d′ are derivation schemas for x and
x′ respectively in O we have: x ∈ CN(O) and Def(d′) ⊆ D′, so x ∈ D′.
Contradiction with the coherence of stable option O. So, E is conflict-free.
Now, let us show that: ∀b ∈ Arg(T ) \ E , ∃a ∈ E s.t. aRub. Let b =
(d, x) /∈ E . Clearly, d uses at least a defeasible rule r (r ∈ Def(d)) s.t.
r /∈ D′. From the definition of a stable option, we have two possible cases.
The first case is that r ∈ CN(F ,S,D′), so there is a minimal derivation
d′ for r in O, i.e., a = (d′, r) is an argument of E . Clearly aRub since
r ∈ Def(d). The second case is that ∃x1 ∈ Body(r) s.t. x1 /∈ CN(O).
Let b1 = (d1, x1) be a sub-argument of b. Since x1 /∈ CN(O), there is no
derivation of x1 in O, so b1 /∈ E . Thus, d1 uses at least a defeasible rule r1
(r1 ∈ Def(d1)) s.t. r1 /∈ D′. Again, from the definition of a stable option,
we have two possible cases. The first case is that r1 ∈ CN(F ,S,D′), so there
is a minimal derivation d′′ for r1 in O, i.e., a = (d′′, r1) is an argument of E .
Clearly aRub1 since r ∈ Def(d1), hence , so aRub. The second case is that
∃x2 ∈ Body(r1) s.t. x2 /∈ CN(O). Let b2 = (d2, x2) be a sub-argument of
b1. Since x2 /∈ CN(O), there is no derivation of x2 in O, so b2 /∈ E . Thus,
d2 uses at least a defeasible rule r2 (r2 ∈ Def(d2)) s.t. r2 /∈ D′, an so one.
Since the set of arguments Arg(T ) \ E is finite, it must exist a sub-argument
bk of b such that aRubk and hence aRub for some a ∈ E .
Let O = (F ,S,D′) ∈ SOpt(T ) and SOption(Arg(O)) = (F ′′,S ′′,D′′).
F ′′ = F follows from the fact that Arg(O) contains every argument (〈x, ∅〉 , x).
S ′′ = S follows from the definition of SOption. Let us show that D′′ = D′.
Let x ∈ D′′. x is used in at least an argument of Arg(O), so x ∈ D′. Thus
we have: D′′ ⊆ D′. Inversely, let x ∈ D′, since Body(x) ⊆ CN(O) (from
the definition of a stable option), x must be used in at least one argument of
Arg(O). Thus x ∈ D′′. So, D′ ⊆ D′′. In summary, F = F ′′, S = S ′′ and
D′ = D′′, i.e., O = SOption(Arg(O)).
Let O1 = (F ,S1,D′1) and O2 = (F ,S2,D′2) be two stable options. Sup-
pose that O1 6= O2, i.e., D′1 6= D′2. It means that either there is x s.t.
x ∈ D′1 and x /∈ D′2 or there is x s.t. x ∈ D′2 and x /∈ D′1. Suppose the first
case. Then, x is used in at least an argument of Arg(O1) and never used in
Arg(O2). So, Arg(O1) 6= Arg(O2). By a similar reasoning, we obtain the
same conclusion for the other case (there is x s.t. x ∈ D′2 and x /∈ D′1).
Proof of Corollary 4. Follows immediately from the bijection between stable
options and stable extensions (theorems 5 - 6).
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Proof of Corollary 5. Follows immediately from the bijection between stable
options and stable extensions (theorems 5 - 6).
Proof of Theorem 7. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) s.t. Extp(H) 6= ∅.
Let us show that for all E ∈ Extp(H), there is a unique O ∈ POpt(T ) s.t.
Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) = CN(O).
Let E ∈ Extp(H) and let Th(E) = (F ′,S ′,D′). We can show that F ′ = F
in a similar way as in Theorem 3, first point. We take O = (F ,S,D′) (we
complete S ′ by the remaining strict rules). Clearly, O is uniquely deter-
mined from E . We have that Concs(E) = CN(Th(E)). Let us show that:
CN((F ,S,D′)) = CN(Th(E)). To do so, it suffices to show that every rule
r ∈ S \ S ′ is not applicable in (F ,S ′,D′). Suppose for the sake of con-
tradiction that there is r ∈ S \ S ′ s.t. r is applicable in (F ,S ′,D′). Thus,
there is a minimal derivation in (F ,S ′,D′) for Head(r)) using r as a last
rule: 〈d, (x, r)〉 s.t. x = Head(r), Def(d) ⊆ D′ and Strict(d) ⊆ S ′.
Thus, a = (〈d, (x, r)〉 , x) is an argument outside E . a does not attack any
argument of E . Indeed, if we suppose the contrary then, since E is a pre-
ferred extension, there is b ∈ E s.t. bRua. So, there is a sub-argument of a:
a′ = (〈d′, (x′, r′)〉 , x′) with r′ ∈ D′ and b = (d′′, r′). However since a′ ∈ E
(because it uses only rules from S′∪D′), this means that E is not conflict-free
which contradicts the fact that E is a preferred extension. So E ∪ {a} is con-
flict free. Moreover, for every c ∈ Arg(T ) \ (E ∪ {a}), if cRua then there is
a sub-argument of a: a′ = (〈d′, (x′, r′)〉 , x′) with x′ ∈ D′ and c = (d′′, x′).
However since a′ ∈ E (because it uses only rules from S′ ∪D′) and E is a
preferred extension, then there is a′ ∈ E such that a′Ruc. This means that
E ∪ {a} is conflict-free and defends all its elements. Contradiction with the
fact that E is maximal. Now let us prove that O = (F ,S,D′) ∈ POpt(T ).
It is obvious that D′ ⊆ D
Similar to the proof of point 2 in Theorem 3.
Similar to the proof of point 3 in Theorem 3.
∀D′′ ⊆ D, if ∃r′ ∈ D′ s.t. r′ ∈ CN(F ,S,D′′) then there is a min-
imal derivation d′ for r′ in (F ,S,D′′), i.e., (d′, r′) is an argument
of Arg(T ). Since r′ ∈ D′ , there in an argument a = (d, x) ∈ E
s.t. r′ ∈ Def(d) and we have bRaa. Since E is a preferred exten-
sion, there is an argument c = (d′′, x′′) ∈ E s.t. cRub, i.e., there is a
derivation d′′ for r′′ in (F ,S,D′) s.t. d′′ ∈ Def(d′). This means that
r′′ ∈ CN(F ,S,D′) and r′′ ∈ D′′.
Suppose that there is D′′ s.t. D′ ⊂ D′′ and D′′ satisfies the previous
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conditions. Let O′ = (F ,S,D′′) and E ′ = Arg(O′). The conflict-
freeness of E ′ follows from the fact that O′ is coherent. Let b = (d, x)
be an argument of Arg(T ) \ E ′ s.t. there is an argument a = (d′, x′) ∈
E ′ and bRua. Thus, x ∈ CN(F ,S, Def(d)) and x ∈ Def(d′), i.e.
x ∈ D′′. But, from the fourth condition of preferred options, there is
r′′ ∈ Def(d) such that r′′ ∈ CN(O). So, there is an argument a′ ∈ E ′
such that a′Rub. Consequently, E ′ is a preferred extension and E ⊂ E ′
which contradicts the fact that E is a preferred extension.
We show by a similar way as in the second point of Theorem 5 that: for all
E , E ′ ∈ Extp(H) if POption(E) = POption(E ′), E = E ′.
Let E ∈ Extp(H). Since Th(E) ⊑ POption(E) and from the defini-
tion of functions Th and Arg it is obvious that E ⊆ Arg(POption(E)).
Now let a = (d, x) ∈ Arg(POption(E)). a = (d, x) is constructed from
POption(E). So, Def(d) ⊆ Defs(POption(E)). Suppose that a /∈ E . Since
E is a preferred extension then we have two cases. The first case is that there
is b = (d′, x′) ∈ E such that bRua. From b ∈ E we easily deduce that
x′ ∈ CN(POption(E)). But then, from bRua, POption(E) must be incoher-
ent. Contradiction with the fact that POption(E) is a preferred option. The
second case is that E does not attack a, a does not attack E but E does not
defend a: there is b = (d′, x′) /∈ E such that bRua and E does not attack
b. From bRua we have x′ ∈ d. Since Def(d) ⊆ Defs(POption(E)) then
x ⊆ Defs(POption(E)). So, x is used in at least an argument c = (d′′, x′′)
of E i.e., x ∈ d′′. Thus, c is attacked by b. But since E is a preferred exten-
sion, then it must contain an argument which attacks b. This contradict the
hypothesis that E does not attack b.
Proof of Theorem 8. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) s.t. Extp(H) 6= ∅.
Let O = (F ,S,D′) ∈ POpt(T ) and let E = Arg(O). We prove that E is
conflict-free, ∀b ∈ Arg(T ) \ E , if ∃a ∈ E s.t. bRua then ∃c ∈ E s.t. cRub
and E is a maximal subset of Arg(T ) satisfying the previous two conditions.
Suppose that there are two argument a = (d, x) and b = (d′, x′) in E s.t.
aRub, i.e., x ∈ Def(d′). But since d and d′ are derivation schemas for x and
x′ respectively in O we have: x ∈ CN(O) and Def(d′) ⊆ D′, so x ∈ D′.
Contradiction with the coherence of preferred option O. So, E is conflict-
free.
Now, let us show that: ∀b ∈ Arg(T )\E , if ∃a ∈ E s.t. bRua then ∃c ∈ E s.t.
cRub. Let b = (d, x) ∈ Arg(T ) \ E and let a = (d′, x′) ∈ E s.t. bRua, i.e.,
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x ∈ CN(F, S, Def(d)) and x ∈ Def(d′). From the fourth conditions of the
definition of a preferred option, there is r′′ ∈ Def(d) s.t. r′′ ∈ CN(F ,S,D′).
So, there is an argument c = (d′′, r′′) with d′′ a minimal derivation of r′′ in
O. Clearly, cRub.
Finally, Suppose that E is not maximal w.r.t. previous conditions. Thus, there
is E ′ s.t. E ⊂ E ′ and E ′ is preferred, i.e., E ′ is an maximal conflict-free set of
arguments that defends all its elements. Let O′(F ,S,D′′) = POption(E ′).
Clearly, D′ 6= D, because there every argument in E ′ \ E uses at least a
rule which is not in D′. Since O′ is a preferred option (Theorem 7), D′′ is
maximal, so D′ ⊂ D′′. This contradicts the fact that O is a preferred option.
Similar to the proof of point 2 of Theorem 6.
Similar to the proof of point 3 of Theorem 6.
Proof of Corollary 6. Follows immediately from the bijection between preferred
options and preferred extensions (theorems 7 - 8).
Proof of Corollary 7. Follows immediately from the bijection between preferred
options and preferred extensions (theorems 7 - 8).
Proof of Theorem 9. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) s.t. Extc(H) 6= ∅.
Let us show that for all E ∈ Extc(H), there is a unique O ∈ COpt(T ) s.t.
Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) = CN(O).
Let E ∈ Extc(H) and let Th(E) = (F ′,S ′,D′). We can show that F ′ = F
in a similar way as in Theorem 3, first point. We take O = (F ,S,D′) (we
complete S ′ by the remaining strict rules). Clearly, O is uniquely deter-
mined from E . We have that Concs(E) = CN(Th(E)). Let us show that:
CN((F ,S,D′)) = CN(Th(E)). To do so, it suffices to show that every rule
r ∈ S \ S ′ is not applicable in (F ,S ′,D′). Suppose for the sake of con-
tradiction that there is r ∈ S \ S ′ s.t. r is applicable in (F ,S ′,D′). Thus,
there is a minimal derivation in (F ,S ′,D′) for Head(r)) using r as a last
rule: 〈d, (x, r)〉 s.t. x = Head(r), Def(d) ⊆ D′ and Strict(d) ⊆ S ′.
Thus, a = (〈d, (x, r)〉 , x) is an argument outside E . a does not attack any
argument of E . Indeed, if we suppose the contrary then, since E is a com-
plete extension, there is b ∈ E s.t. bRua. So, there is a sub-argument of a:
a′ = (〈d′, (x′, r′)〉 , x′) with r′ ∈ D′ and b = (d′′, r′). However since a′ ∈ E
(because it uses only rules from S′∪D′), this means that E is not conflict-free
which contradicts the fact that E is a complete extension. So E ∪ {a} is con-
flict free. Moreover, for every c ∈ Arg(T ) \ (E ∪ {a}), if cRua then there is
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a sub-argument of a: a′ = (〈d′, (x′, r′)〉 , x′) with x′ ∈ D′ and c = (d′′, x′).
However since a′ ∈ E (because it uses only rules from S′ ∪D′) and E is a
complete extension, then there is a′ ∈ E such that a′Ruc. This means that
E defends a. Contradiction with the fact that E contains all the arguments it
defends. Now let us prove that O = (F ,S,D′) ∈ POpt(T ).
It is obvious that D′ ⊆ D
Similar to the proof of point 2 in Theorem 3.
Similar to the proof of point 3 in Theorem 3.
Similar to the proof of point 4 in Theorem 7.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose that ∃r ∈ D \ D′, ∃D1 ⊆ D
s.t. r ∈ D1 and Body(r) ∈ CN((F ,S,D1)) and ∀D′′ ⊆ D, if D1 ∩
CN((F ,S,D′′)) 6= ∅ then ∃r′′ ∈ D′′, r′′ ∈ CN((F ,S,D′)).
From the fact: ∃D1 ⊆ D s.t. r ∈ D1 and Body(r) ∈ CN((F ,S,D1))
we deduce that r is applicable in (F ,S,D1), so there is at least an
argument a ∈ Arg((F ,S,D1)) where Defs(a) ⊆ D1 and clearly a /∈
E . From the fact: ∀D′′ ⊆ D, if D1 ∩ CN((F ,S,D′′)) 6= ∅ then ∃r′′ ∈
D′′, r′′ ∈ CN((F ,S,D′)). Let a ∈ Arg((F ,S,D1)). If D′′ ⊆ D is
s.t. Defs(a) ∩ CN((F ,S,D′′)) 6= ∅ then there is at least argument in
Arg((F ,S,D′′)) which attacks a. Moreover, for all such argument b,
we have Defs(b) ⊆ D′′ and Defs(a) ∩ CN((F ,S, Defs(b))) 6= ∅. It
follows that ∃r′′ ∈ Def(b), r′′ ∈ CN((F ,S,D′)). This means that for
all argument b Ru a there is and argument c in E s.t. c Ru b, i.e. E
defends a. But this contradicts the fact that E is a complete extension
since a /∈ E .
We show by a similar way as in the second point of Theorem 5 that: for all
E , E ′ ∈ Extc(H) if COption(E) = COption(E ′), E = E ′.
A similar reasoning as that used in the third point of Theorem 7 may be used
to prove that for all E ∈ Extc(H), E = Arg(COption(E)).
Proof of Theorem 10. Let H = (Arg(T ),Ru) s.t. Extc(H) 6= ∅.
Let O = (F ,S,D′) ∈ COpt(T ) and let E = Arg(O). We prove that E is
conflict-free, ∀b ∈ Arg(T ) \ E , if ∃a ∈ E s.t. bRua then ∃c ∈ E s.t. cRub
and E contains every argument it defends.
The two first conditions are proved in similar way as in Theorem 8.
Now, suppose for the sake of contradiction that the third condition does not
hold which means that we suppose that there is a /∈ E s.t. E defends a, i.e.
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for all b ∈ Arg(T ), if
¯
Ru a then there exists c ∈ E s.t. c Ru b. Let us
put a = (d, x) and D1 = Defs(d). Since, a /∈ E then there is r ∈ D \ D′
such that r1 ∈ Defs(d) = D1 and clearly Body(r) ⊆ CN((F ,S,D1)).
For all D′′ ⊆ D suppose that D1 ∩ CN((F ,S,D′′)) 6= ∅. It follows that
there is an arguments b = (d′, x′) s.t. Defs(d′) ⊆ D′′ and x′ ∈ D1, i.e.,
b Ru a. In this case, there is an argument c = (d1, x1) s.t. c Ru b, i.e.,
there exists r′′ ∈ Defs(d′) hence r′′ ∈ D′′ s.t. x1 = r′′. Since clearly
x1 ∈ CN((F ,S,D
′)) it follows that: r1 ∈ CN((F ,S,D′)). This contradicts
the last condition of the definition of a complete option.
Similar to the proof of point 2 of Theorem 6.
Similar to the proof of point 3 of Theorem 6.
Proof of Corollary 8. Follows immediately from the bijection between complete
options and complete extensions (theorems 9 - 10).
Proof of Corollary 9. Follows immediately from the bijection between complete
options and complete extensions (theorems 9 - 10).
Proof of Theorem 11. LetH = (Arg(T ),Ru) be an AS built over a closed theory
T = (F ,S,D).
Let E = Extg(H). E is the minimal (wrt set inclusion) complete exten-
sion of H. From Theorem 9, it follows that there exists a complete op-
tion O ∈ COpt(T ) s.t. Th(E) ⊑ O and Concs(E) = CN(O). Let us
put O = (F ,S,D′) and suppose for the sake of contradiction that O is
not the grounded option of T , i.e., that there exists D′′ ⊂ D′ such that
O′ = (F ,S,D′′) is a complete option. From Theorem 10, E ′ = Arg(O′) is a
complete extension ofH. Let us show that E ′ ⊂ E . Let r be a rule inD′\D′′.
From the definition of complete options (third point), it follows that there is
(at least) an argument a = (d, x) ∈ Arg(O) = E s.t. r ∈ Defs(a). Clearly
a /∈ Arg(O′) = E ′ since r /∈ D′′. It follows that E ′ ⊂ E . Contradiction with
the fact that E is the grounded extension of H.
A similar reasoning as that used in the third point of Theorem 7 may be used
to prove that if E = Extg(H), then E = Arg(GOption(E)).
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